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REINFORCING THE LAW OF THE SEA 




That the Law of the Sea Convention faces implementation 
challenges is nothing new; it is, as many have noted, a framework 
and a scaffold - a constitution for the oceans - which necessarily left 
many matters of detail to future negotiation, associated instruments, 
and state practice. What has emerged over the last two decades, 
however, is an increasing reluctance on the part of states to pursue 
implantation via new, more detailed, treaty commitments. This 
article explores alternative options for enhancing Law of the Sea 
Convention compliance - options that do not necessarily require the 
'more law' path to granularity and implementation. The analysis 
begins by describing the amenability of the LOSC to refinement 
processes, focusing upon its flexibility (including its ‘constructive 
ambiguity’) and conduciveness (the significant allowance built into 
the LOSC for domestic contextualization, interpretation, and 
implementation). With this background established, the analysis 
then explores four alternative pathways to facilitating and 
reinforcing compliance - pathways that do not involve the 
negotiation of additional hard law or mixed hard/soft law 
instruments, nor the establishment of new governance institutions. 
The first alternative is to employ a ‘process’ approach, noting the 
relative success of this option in the maritime domain as represented 
by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The second alternative 
approach is the adaptable employment of existing rules to meet an 
evolving governance challenge - the issue of privately contracted 
armed security personnel (PCASP) being a case study on point. The 
third option is to apply refined interpretive endeavors to existing 
1 Professor of Military and Security Law; Director, Australian Centre for the 
Study of Armed Conflict and Society, UNSW Canberra; 
r.mclaughlin@adfa.edu.au.
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authorizations which have hitherto been subject to relatively 
superficial analysis and application – for example, in relation to 
vessels without nationality (VWON) and counter-drug interdictions 
at sea. The fourth option is the employment of existing but under-
utilized LOSC-based or LOSC-leveraged mechanisms and 
authorizations - such as Article 17 of the Vienna Convention on 
Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 - in 
new or expanded ways. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
When faced with a seemingly difficult governance problem, 
the international community has often resorted to the logical, 
formal, and contextually sensible approach of filling the identified 
gap with new, legally binding obligations. This is often 
accompanied by bespoke institutions designed to facilitate these 
new obligations, and (in many cases) to provide an independent 
clearing house for ongoing implementation, record keeping, and in 
some cases dispute resolution. Thus, for example, when space 
exploration and exploitation became a technological reality, 
concerned states acted quickly to create a governance regime that 
would preserve this newly accessible global commons from 
sovereignty claims. Thus, Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty of 
19672, and Article 1 of the Moon Treaty of 19793 provide that (to 
quote the Outer Space Treaty): “Outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means.” Similarly, although it is small and under-resourced 
compared to many national and regional space agencies, the United 
Nations (U.N.) Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) was 
created as a vehicle to ‘promote international cooperation in the 
peaceful use and exploration of space, and in the utilization of space 
science and technology for sustainable economic and social 
development’.4 This use of a ‘more law’ solution—often, but not 
2 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S., 205. 
3 G.A. 34/68, annex, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979). 
4 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, About Us, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/index.html, [https://perma.cc/K32M-
YQYK] (last visited 23 Aug 2019); the UNOOSA was originally created to 
support the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, established 
by General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958). Amongst its other 
roles, UNOOSA maintains the U.N. Register of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, is the U.N. focal point for the United Nations Platform for Space-based 
Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), 
and is the secretariat for the International Committee on Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems. Citations? 
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invariably, accompanied by the concurrent creation of an 
international institution to foster and support the principles 
enunciated and obligations created—is thus a well-trod path in 
dealing with multilateral governance challenges. The original global 
commons governance challenge was the sea, and it is therefore little 
surprise that the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (LOSC), its 
predecessor instruments, and its many associated institutions5 
reflect this particularly state-centric and state-managed governance 
response. However, there are recent indications of push-back against 
this more law approach in the new “global commons” of 
cyberspace,6 and to some extent this hesitancy is also being reflected 
in the original global commons of the oceans. 
There are many reasons for this evolving tendency. One 
consequence of the ‘more law’ approach can be a form of legal 
overload or even paralysis—particularly for smaller or less agile 
states—such that the implementation of new obligations is at best 
superficial, and at worst ignored.7 Another risk is ‘treaty congestion’ 
– a phenomenon often remarked upon in the area of international
5 For example, The Deep Seabed Authority, the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the 
roles and mandates bequeathed by components of the LOSC 1982 to other 
existing and separate institutions such as the International Maritime 
Organization. Citation? 
6 See, e.g., Rob McLaughlin and Michael Schmitt, The need for clarity in 
international cyber law: International law implications of the lack of consensus, 
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC POLICY FORUM, (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.policyforum.net/the-need-for-clarity-in-international-cyber-law/, 
[https://perma.cc/VBE9-JP85]; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 2-6 (Michael Schmitt ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2017); Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, THE NATURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CYBER NORMS 12 (Tallinn Papers No. 5), NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543520, 
[https://perma.cc/P82J-JBBZ]; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Cyber Security without 
Cyber War 17:2 J. of Conflict and Security L. 187, 206 (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Reflections on state obligations with respect to 
economic, social and cultural rights in international human rights law 16:6 Int’l 
J. of Human Rights 969 (2011).
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environmental law8 – which leads to lack of coordination, delayed 
or piecemeal implementation, and often debilitating capacity 
challenges. It is the central thesis of this short article that the best 
way to remedy implementation gaps is not always to overlay an 
existing governance regime with further layers of formal treaty law 
or institutions, but rather to better employ the powers, 
authorizations, and structures already available under that regime in 
order to facilitate improved understanding, implementation, and 
response. That is, legal lacunae – obligation or governance gaps – 
must be distinguished from implementation gaps. This is because 
whilst the most appropriate response to obligation gaps may indeed 
be the creation of new and more detailed legal obligations, the better 
response to governance gaps is often more effective reinforcement 
of existing law. 
A. Outline
This article will begin with an outline of the amenability of 
the LOSC to refinement processes, focusing upon two interlinked 
factors: Flexibility – particularly in the form of ‘constructive 
ambiguity’; and conduciveness - the significant allowance built into 
the LOSC for domestic contextualization, interpretation, and 
implementation. These are not the only factors that inform the 
LOSC’s particular adaptability – the ability to renegotiate or refine 
via additional agreements such as (respectively) on Part XI,9 and on 
straddling stocks,10 for example, is equally important. However, it 
is the LOSC’s internal flexibility and external conduciveness that 
are most relevant to the purposes of this article. Following this 
setting of the scene, with respect to the windows into alternative 
8 See, e.g., Don Anton, “Treaty Congestion” in Contemporary International 
Environmental Law, in Routledge Handbook of International Environmental 
Law, 651 (Erika Techera et.al. eds., 2012). 
9 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Jul. 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S 3.  
10 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S 3. 
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mechanisms that these organic characteristics of the LOSC ensure, 
the analysis will briefly describe the hard law/soft law context 
within which such alternative pathways for reinforcing the LOSC 
must be placed. Focusing upon ‘more law’ options such as Incidents 
at Sea Agreements, and mixed hard/soft law instruments such as 
‘codes of conduct.’ Following this, I will outline four alternative 
pathways to facilitating and reinforcing compliance - pathways that 
do not involve the negotiation of additional hard law or mixed 
hard/soft law instruments, nor the establishment of new governance 
institutions. The first alternative is to employ a ‘process’ approach, 
noting the relative success of this option in the maritime domain as 
represented by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The 
second alternative approach is the adaptable employment of existing 
rules to meet an evolving governance challenge. To this end I shall 
briefly note the issue of privately contracted armed security 
personnel (PCASP) as a case study illustrating how the practically 
focused and contextually sensible application of existing rules to 
emerging concerns can alleviate the need for new law and new 
institutions. The third option is to apply refined interpretive 
endeavors to existing authorizations which have hitherto been 
subject to relatively superficial analysis and application. The issue 
of vessels without nationality (VWON) and counter-drug 
interdictions at sea offers a case study in point. The fourth option is 
the employment of existing but under-utilized LOSC-based or 
LOSC-leveraged mechanisms and authorizations - such as Article 
17 of the Vienna Convention on Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988 - in new or expanded ways. This can 
then create the confidence and experience necessary for deeper 
engagement and cooperation, without the need to negotiate and 
create new obligations or new institutions. 
II. KEY FACILITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LOSC:
FLEXIBILITY AND CONDUCIVENESS 
Despite an almost 100 year absence of piracy prosecutions, 
LOSC-based international and domestic responses to piracy off the 
Horn of Africa beginning in the mid-2000s were characterized by 
an evolutionary and increasingly robust – but relatively non-
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contentious and historically well-grounded – approach to seeking 
legal rather than simply operational (‘catch and release’) finishes to 
at-sea interdictions. Indeed, the deterrent effects (and challenges) of 
piracy prosecutions and apprehensions - even as the economic costs 
of piracy continued to rise11 - ultimately played an important role, 
in conjunction with other development and security projects ashore 
in relation to prisons and improved security,12 in reducing the 
incidence of Somali piracy. This outcome was underpinned by the 
fact that the LOSC is very tolerant of iterative refinement in 
implementation - the product of, inter alia, it’s flexibility and the 
significant allowances built into the LOSC for domestic 
contextualization, interpretation, and implementation – its 
conduciveness. These two fundamental strengths in turn facilitate 
the amenability of the LOSC to clarification and implementation 
through the alternative mechanisms analyzed in section four below. 
It is thus important at the outset to briefly outline why, and furnish 
some examples of how, each of these inbuilt facilitative attributes 
can operate. 
11 See Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy (2012),  
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/View%20Full%20




12 See The Economist Explains, What happened to Somalia’s pirates?, THE
ECONOMIST, (May 19, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-
explains/2013/05/economist-explains-11, [https://perma.cc/B9W8-XDGS]. This 
was certainly the case for Seychelles and Mauritius, smaller states in which the 
introduction of multiple cadres of Somali pirate suspects and convicted pirates 
(given that apprehensions are often of components of, or the whole of, Pirate 
Action Groups, which generally number 5-12 people) had a significant 
consequence on local prison capacity. By late 2011, for example, Somali pirates 
already comprised 20% of the Seychelles prison population. See UNODC, 
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A. Flexibility in the face of inconsistency
The LOSC 1982 is noted for its flexibility – an attribute 
built-in at the time of negotiation via the well-analyzed consensus 
approach to drafting, and the universalist intentions of the “package-
deal” outcome. There is no doubt that individual instances of this 
flexibility are often contentious – two examples will be noted 
immediately below; but it is also clear that the very fact that these 
interpretive differences are enduring but not debilitating also 
indicates a conscious and consistent acknowledgement of the 
benefits of this flexibility. By facilitating “constructive ambiguity” 
– amongst other mechanisms – the LOSC has sought to privilege
superficial reconciliation of otherwise irreconcilable interpretive
differences in the name of the universalist aspirations of the
instrument. Two examples will demonstrate this flexibility in the
face of inconsistency: The issue of warship innocent passage;13 and
the inherent flexibility built into the right of a Coastal State to
“require” a delinquent warship to depart the Territorial Sea.14
In relation to warship innocent passage, on one reading there 
is little room for reconciliation between – as avatars for this 
divergence – the interpretations of the US and the Peoples’ Republic 
of China (PRC) in relation to the issue of prior notification or 
permission for warship innocent passage. The long-held PRC view 
– reiterated often during the UNCLOS III negotiations and
maintained assiduously since – is that warships may not engage in
innocent passage through the PRC territorial sea without prior
authorization from the Chinese government.15 This view has been
highly consistent since the PRC’s 1973 Position Paper, and its 1982
13 LOSC arts 17-20. 
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 30, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
15 Working paper on Sea Area Within the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 
submitted by the Chinese Delegation, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of Nat’l Jurisdiction, Subcomm. II, 
¶ 1(8), U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34 (July 16, 1973).  
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Declaration.16 In its 1996 Declaration upon Ratification of the 
LOSC, China specifically reiterated this interpretation: 
4. The People’s Republic of China reaffirms that the
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through
the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a
coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws
and regulations, a foreign State to obtain advance
approval from or give prior notification to the coastal
State for the passage of its warships through the
territorial sea of the coastal State.17
Current PRC legislation enshrines this view: the Law on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992 
specifically provides, inter alia, that “[n]on-military foreign ships 
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the 
People’s Republic of China according to law. To enter the territorial 
sea of the People’s Republic of China, foreign military ships must 
obtain permission from the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China.”18 
16 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 191st Plenary 
Meeting, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR191 (Dec. 9, 1982). 
17United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Declarations and 




18 PRC, Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February
1992,
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CH
N_1992_Law.pdf, [https://perma.cc/8RPH-QSV9]; see generally Hungdah
Chiu, China and the Law of the Sea Conference, in CHINA IN THE GLOBAL 
COMMUNITY, 187-215 (James Hsjung & Samuel Kim eds., 1980); Zou Keyuan,
Innocent passage for warships: The Chinese doctrine and practice 29:3 OCEAN 
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (1998).
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By contrast, and despite a contrary view being expressed 
during codification conferences in 1930,19 the consistent US view 
during and since UNCLOS III has been that warships enjoy the right 
of innocent passage in the same way as merchant vessels; there is no 
requirement for warships to seek prior authorization for, or give 
advance notice of, innocent passage through another state’s 
territorial sea: “[a]ll ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, 
armament or means of propulsion, enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea in accordance with international 
law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is 
required.”20 
Yet the LOSC and its associated procedures are also flexible 
enough to take account of and reflect customary practice that, to 
some extent, mitigates the dialectical force of this dichotomy in 
certain otherwise highly contentious situations. The key example of 
this is the fact that for a warship to visit another State’s port, it must 
first secure diplomatic clearance. This process is in all normal 
circumstances completed well in advance of the warship appearing 
at the outer limit of the port State’s territorial sea. Thus – in the 
situation, for example, of a US warship visiting a PRC port – both 
states are able to maintain their otherwise diametrically opposed 
interpretations of the broader regime for warship innocent passage 
by virtue of flexible appreciations of the purposes achieved through 
19 See, e.g., Reply of the United States to the Questionnaire of the Preparatory 
Committee, League of Nations Doc C.74.M.39.1929.V, at 66, 73 (1929); Sixth 
Meeting of the Second Committee on Territorial Waters of the Conference for 
the Codification of International Law, League of Nations Doc C.351(b).l93O.V, 
at 59 (1930); see generally William Butler, Innocent Passage and the 1982 
Convention: The Influence of Soviet Law and Policy, 81:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331 (1987); Erik Franckx, Innocent passage of 
warships: recent developments in US-Soviet relations, 14:6 MARINE POLICY 
467, 484 (1990). 
20 See, e.g., 1989 USA-USSR Joint Statement On The Uniform Interpretation Of 
Rules Of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, ¶ 2, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 
Sept. 23, 1989. 
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utilization of the associated DIPCLEAR process.21 The US can 
rightly claim that it has not given prior notification as to warship 
innocent passage through the PRC territorial sea, but rather it has 
merely sought and received port entry DIPCLEAR in accordance 
with long-standing customary law of the sea. The PRC, on the other 
hand, is able to dress the DIPCLEAR as simultaneous prior 
permission to the visiting warship to engage in innocent passage 
through the territorial sea whilst inbound to the relevant port. 
The second example is the inherent flexibility of the coastal 
State’s right to require a delinquent warship to leave the territorial 
sea. For some states, “require” carries with it implications parallel 
with diplomatic protests and demarches – that is, the scope of the 
right to “require” is essentially declaratory and bound by the 
obligation to resolve disputes by peaceful means.22 For other states, 
“require” carries with it permission to use force, as a last resort, to 
effect the warship’s removal from the territorial sea. During the 
Cold War, for example, Sweden consistently argued for, and 
employed, the right to use depth charges as a means of “requiring” 
dived Soviet submarines (a breach of Article 20) to depart the 
Swedish Territorial Sea.23 These interpretations – diplomatic note 
through to depth charge – are incompatible in relation to each other, 
21 E.g., Australia – https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/foreign-
embassies/protocol/Pages/diplomatic-clearances-aircraft-and-ships.aspx, 
[https://perma.cc/EYZ8-8P27]; Latvia – https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/about-the-
ministry/state-protocol/naval-vessels, [https://perma.cc/SS7L-VK4X]; 
Seychelles – http://www.mfa.gov.sc/uploads/files/filepath_25.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/YX8X-PQ4K]. 
22 See, e.g., David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-Innocent Passage of 
Warships in the Territorial Sea 21 San Diego L. Rev. 625 (1983); Bernard 
Oxman, The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 24:4 Va. J. Int’l L. 809, 816-19 (1984).  
23 See, e.g., Roma Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Waters: The 
Erosion of an International Norm 10:1  Yale J. Int’l L. 34 (1984); Sebastien 
Roblin, How a Whiskey on the Rocks Nearly Started a War Between Russia and 
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but manageable if not reconcilable as alternatives predicated upon 
the flexibility inherent in the single word “require.” 
B. Conduciveness: A clear space for domestic
contextualization, interpretation, and implementation
Closely associated with this inherent, consciously 
internalized flexibility in the name of universality when confronted 
by inconsistency, is the LOSC’s allowance for - and high tolerance 
of – particularized and contextualized domestic implementation. 
This is evident, for example, in the variable domestic treatment of 
the crime of piracy. The LOSC 1982 provides the international 
anchor point for coherence and consistency as to the minimum 
elements of the crime,24 and the conditions under which universal 
jurisdiction applies,25 but does not strictly mandate how 
domestication of the offence must be achieved. To this end it is 
important to consider the implied prescriptive jurisdiction 
requirements that attend the crystallization of the law on piracy in 
the LOSC 1982.26 With its many nuances (such as the “two ship 
24 LOSC, art 101. 
25 LOSC, art 105. On the concept of universal jurisdiction, see inter alia, Trial of 
Wilhelm List and Others (Hostages Trial) (1948) (Case N0. 47) Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals: Vol VIII (1949) 34 at 54 – available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-8.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/F5QV-JZQV]. Some scholars have noted that the origins of 
‘universal jurisdiction’ in relation to piracy might lend themselves to more 
accurate description as universal concurrent municipal jurisdiction. However, 
this does not in any way mitigate or attenuate the raw authority that resides in 
appropriately authorized state vessels (such as warships) to take initial action 
against suspect pirates and pirate vessels. See, T. Paige, The Role of the Law in 
the Rise and Fall of Piracy (Master of Philosophy Thesis, Australian National 
University, 2013). 
26 For an as yet unparalleled general history of piracy as a legal concept, see 
Alfred Rubin, The Law of Piracy (1988) 63 International Law Studies. For an 
analysis of how one important jurisprudential actor – the US Supreme Court 
under Chief Justice Marshall – played an important role in developing and 
defining the law of piracy in a domestic context, but with international law 
consequences, see White, ‘The Marshall Court and International Law: The 
Piracy Cases’ (1989) 83 American Journal f International Law 727. 
2020] Reinforcing the LOSC 143 
rule”27) and its organic uncertainties (such as whether shore based 
facilitation also comes under universal jurisdiction28) it is important 
to recognize that the LOSC offers an anchor-point for coherent 
national implementation and international cooperation rather than a 
necessarily strict and limiting elaboration of the crime. Indeed, 
domestic jurisdictions have understandably taken a variety of paths 
to criminalizing the offence of piracy within their national laws, and 
this has created a range of variations upon the central theme. This is 
not a failure of the LOSC, but rather a strength. For example, piracy 
is one of the very few crimes specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution of the United States, itself highly indicative of the long 
international provenance of the issue as one of global concern 
requiring high levels of conduciveness given its transnational and 
extra-national nature: The Congress shall have Power …To define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations…29 
Australian law, adopting a different approach, simply criminalizes 
piracy as follows: 
Section 51: act of piracy means an act of violence, detention 
or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or 
passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed: 
27 This constituent element is one reason that the Achille Lauro incident (which 
involved acts of violence, detention, and depredation being perpetrated by 
individuals who had already embarked upon the ship in port, emerging to 
commit their acts once she had sailed) was not generally characterisable as 
‘piracy’ in accordance with the LOSC definition. The issue of ‘private ends’ – 
the perpetrators being members of the Palestine Liberation Front, and having 
made demands regarding the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners by Israel – was 
also debated. See generally Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: 
The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 Am. 
J. of Int’l L. 269 (1988); See also Jose Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships
Against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects, 18 Int’l J. Marine &
Coastal L. 363, 376-379 (2003).
28 See United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1986); See also Tamsin
Paige, Piracy and Universal Jurisdiction, 12 Macquarie L. J. 131 (2013).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I., §8.
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(a) if the act is done on the high seas or in the coastal sea of
Australia—against another ship or aircraft or against persons
or property on board another ship or aircraft; or
(b) if the act is done in a place beyond the jurisdiction of any
country—against a ship, aircraft, persons or property.
Section 52: Piracy 
A person must not perform an act of piracy… 
Section 53: Operating a pirate-controlled ship or aircraft 
(1) A person must not voluntarily participate in the operation
of a pirate-controlled ship or aircraft knowing that it is such
a ship or aircraft.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 15 years.
(2) This section applies to acts performed on the high seas,
in places beyond the jurisdiction of any country or in
Australia…
Section 55: Written consent of Attorney-General required 
(1) A prosecution for an offence against this Part requires the
consent of the Attorney-General.
(2) Despite subsection (1):
(a) a person may be arrested for an offence referred to in
subsection (1), and a warrant for such an arrest may be issued
and executed; and
(b) a person may be charged with such an offence; and
(c) a person so charged may be remanded in custody or on
bail;
but no further step in the proceedings referred to in
subsection (1) is to be taken until the Attorney-General’s
consent has been given.
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) prevents the discharge of the
accused if proceedings are not continued within a reasonable
time.30
The international law definition (as encapsulated in the 
LOSC) is thus generally replicated, but an overlay of additional 
30 Crimes Act 1914 (Austl.). 
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jurisdictional authorization is imposed. By contrast, the Kenyan 
Penal Code (until recently) criminalized piracy by reference to its 
ultimate source in international law, rather than through a recitation 
of strict elements. Amendments to the Kenyan Merchant Shipping 
Act31 have introduced a new offence of piracy couched in the same 
terms as LOSC Art 101, and the new Kenyan Constitution adopts a 
more (and for a common law State, unusual) monist approach to the 
incorporation of international law into Kenyan law.32 The now 
repealed section 69(1) of the Kenyan Penal Code criminalized 
piracy stating: “[a]ny person who in territorial waters or upon the 
high seas, commits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of the 
offence of piracy.”33  
31 Merchant Shipping Act (2012) Cap. 371 § 369 (Kenya). 
32 CONSTITUTION art. 1 §2 (2010) (Kenya) (“Supremacy of this Constitution 
(1) This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all persons
and all State organs at both levels of government …
(4) Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this Constitution
is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in
contravention of this Constitution is invalid.
(5) The general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya.
(6) Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of
Kenya under this Constitution …”).
33 See An Act of Parliament to establish a penal code (2014) Cap. 63 (Kenya)
(referencing piracy as it stood prior to the repeal of s:61(1)). See also Republic
v. Chief Magistrate Ct., Mombasa, ex parte Mohamud Mohamed Hashi & Eight
Others, (2010) eKLR (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (dealing specifically with a
jurisdictional issue related to the relationship between the definition of piracy
jure gentium, the High Seas authorization, universal jurisdiction, and the
territorial limitations contained within s:5 of the Kenyan Penal Code). . For a
thorough analysis of the MV Courier Case see, e.g. Jon Bellish, After a Brief
Hiatus Kenya Once Again Has Universal Jurisdiction Over Pirates, BLOG OF
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (October 24,
2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/after-a-brief-hiatus-kenya-once-again-has-
universal-jurisdiction-over-pirates/, [https://perma.cc/5LPE-YY65]; contra
James Thou Gathii, Piracy Prosecution: Kenya's Piracy Prosecution, 104
A.J.I.L. 416 (2010) (analysing early Kenyan piracy cases); James Theu Gathii,
Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates Captured by Third States Under
Kenyan and International Law, LOY. L.A. INT'L. & COMP. L.R. 363 (2009)
(analysing early Kenyan piracy cases).
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Canada takes a not dissimilar approach, referring to the Law 
of Nations for a precise, elemental definition, but also criminalizing 
as “piratical acts” certain other conduct with a Canadian nexus, 
regardless of whether it takes place within Canada (including the 
Territorial Sea) or in international waters: 
Piracy by law of nations 
Section 74. (1) Everyone commits piracy 
who does any act that, by the law of nations, 
is piracy. 
Punishment 
(2) Everyone who commits piracy while in
or out of Canada is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
Piratical acts
Section 75. Everyone who, while in or out of
Canada
(a) steals a Canadian ship,
(b) steals or without lawful authority throws
overboard, damages or destroys anything
that is part of the cargo, supplies or fittings
in a Canadian ship,
(c) does or attempts to do a mutinous act on
a Canadian ship, or
(d) counsels a person to do anything
mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c),
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
fourteen years.34
Thus, the prima facie unifying basis within the LOSC in relation to 
this crime of universal jurisdiction is in fact quite permissive and 
tolerant of variety when considered from the “next step” perspective 
of national implementation of the available jurisdiction. 
34 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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This is not to say, however, that the domestication endeavor 
anticipated by and required of the LOSC’s treatment of piracy is 
universally seamless, albeit varied. This is most evident in the 
scramble to domesticate laws criminalizing piracy in the wake of 
increases in piracy off the Horn of Africa in the mid to late 2000s. 
This was, and remains, an issue precisely because, for many states 
the existence of an international legal authority is explicitly only one 
part of the empowerment scheme. The other vital component is an 
adequate domestic implementation of the international authorization 
such that the agents of directly engaged states can take appropriate 
steps in support of any internationally agreed plan to tackle the 
problem. Yet despite the unparalleled scope of action available 
under universal jurisdiction, some states have in the past (and some 
still do) required a nexus to their territory (including in terms of 
effects), citizens, or vessels as a jurisdictional pre-condition for 
prosecuting piracy.35 There are many case studies on point.36 
Denmark was an early contributor to counter piracy 
responses off the Horn of Africa, engaging in both World Food 
Program vessel escort, and broader counter piracy operations.37 
35 See Douglas Guilfoyle, Counter-piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights, 
59 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 152-167 (2010) (discussing the most pressing domestic 
law issues that affect implementing domestic piracy jurisdiction either for 
national prosecutions or for transfers to third-party states for prosecution). See 
also Efthymios Papastavridis, II. European Court of Human Rights Medvedyev 
et al v. France (Grand Chamber, Application No. 3394/03) Judgment of 29 
March 2010, 59 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 867-882 (2010) (discussing issues 
surrounding counter piracy operations suggested by the European Court of 
Human Rights). 
36 Another useful case study is the 2011 decision in the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Korea in relation to the MV Samho Jewelry case – a South Korean 
flagged vessel – but which ultimately endorsed the need for amendments to 
South Korean law so as to bring to bear the full scope and applicability of 
universal jurisdiction over the offence within South Korean jurisdiction: 
Seokwoo Lee & Kil Park, Republic of Korea v Araye 106 Am. J. of Int’l L. 630 
(2012). 
37 See Dan B. Termansen, Counter Piracy off Somalia; A Case for Applying the 
Comprehensive Approach Strategy?, (Jan. 03, 2011), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706790, [https://perma.cc/TAT9-A3A7]; 
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However, on arriving in theatre, the Royal Danish Navy’s presence 
was not initially backstopped by a Danish law criminalizing piracy 
to the full extent available.38 As a consequence, an early 
apprehension of suspected Somali pirates in which there was solid 
evidence available for a prosecution (effectively, the detained 
suspects were caught in the act of attempting to pirate a merchant 
vessel), resulted in a transfer of the suspects to the Netherlands for 
prosecution.39 In part, this transfer was at the request of the Dutch 
authorities, as the suspects had attacked a Dutch vessel; in part it 
was because (at that time) the offence of piracy in Danish law did 
not fully reflect universal jurisdiction, and effectively ruled out a 
Danish prosecution option.40 Similarly, after another apprehension 
(September 2009), the narrower Danish law at the time - requiring a 
nexus to a Danish vessel or Danish nationals – coupled with issues 
of evidential transfer in terms of alternative prosecution venues, 
resulted in ten suspects being released to shore in Somalia.41 Even 
for states as committed to that particular coordinated counter piracy 
endeavor as Denmark, overcoming the challenges of “tactically” 
implementing the juridically unimpeachable “strategic” authority 
for universal jurisdiction have proven far from simple. 
Thus, it is evident that within the piracy context (as an 
example), the glue that binds a diverse array of actors (States, the 
U.N. and other international organizations, NGOs, industry, etc.) in 
a jurisdictional sense is also the mechanism that facilitates 
Government of Denmark, Strategy for the Danish Counter Piracy Effort 2011-
2014, (2011), http://um.dk/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-
diplomacy/Pirateristrategi_2011_ENG_WEB.PDF. See generally, M.D. Fink & 
R.J. Galvin, Combatting Pirates off the Coast of Somalia: Current Legal 
Challenge, 56:3 Neth. Int’l L. R. 367 (2009). 
38 See Sebastien Gottlieeb, ‘Pirates tried under never used Dutch law,’ Radio 
Netherlands Worldwide, (Jan. 16, 2009), http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2122573.ece, 
[https://perma.cc/7FQN-FNJN]; Oliver Hawkins, ‘What to do with a captured 
pirate’, BBC Radio 4, (Mar. 10, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm, 
[https://perma.cc/3KHP-GM2L]; Tulia Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use 
of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 20:2 Eur. J. of Int’l L. 399 
(2009). 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
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coordination and information sharing processes in the name of 
shared interests. The facilitative approach to allowing space for 
domestic contextualization and municipally-sensitive 
implementation42 — its flexibility and conduciveness – is central to 
this capacity. Combined, these features of the LOSC provide 
particularly strong evidence for the fact that discrete, ad hoc – and 
indeed, even dissonant –responses to implementation challenges is 
not necessarily a failure of the LOSC system, but rather an indicia 
of its strength. However, organic flexibility and conduciveness can 
often only facilitate implementation so far, and once that threshold 
is reached, alternative mechanisms, approaches, and processes 
become necessary. Some of these alternatives are traditional and 
formal (such as negotiating new law or instruments), whilst others 
are more informal and bespoke. It is to these that I now turn. 
III. MORE HARD LAW, OR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING
LAW? 
Before embarking upon a discussion of the hard and soft law 
approaches to addressing governance challenges in the maritime 
domain, it is apposite to briefly define these two concepts. Although 
the literature on this concept set is extensive and nuanced, for the 
purposes of this article a brief distinction will suffice. To this end, 
“hard law” is describable as “legally binding obligations that are 
precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance 
of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting 
and implementing the law.”43  “Soft law,” by contrast, takes as its 
fundamental attribute its non-legally binding nature, regardless of 
its superficial appearance as “legal” or “non-legal” in terms of its 
instrumental nature. As Christine Chinkin has observed, 
Soft law instruments range from treaties, but which include 
obligations (“legal soft law”), to non-binding or voluntary 
resolutions and codes of conduct formulated and accepted by 
42 See generally, Kate Jones, Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key 
Criticisms, 57 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 182 (2008) (U.K.).  
43 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 Int’l Org. 421, 421 (2000).  
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international regional organizations (“non-legal soft law”), 
to statements prepared by individuals in a non-governmental 
capacity, but which purport to lay down international 
principles.44 
A. Hard Law Options
When seeking to overcome a governance challenge there are 
often three significant initial hurdles to adopting a “more hard law” 
approach: State resistance to “more law;” identifying the “gaps;” 
and time. I shall briefly note each, simply in order to provide 
background context as to why other less formal and less binding 
options for addressing LOSC of 1982 implementation challenges 
may be more attractive to states. 
Overcoming initial state reluctance to being bound by “more 
law” is not always a simple task when proposing initiatives that 
involve further and more detailed hard law instruments. This 
reluctance is sometimes, but not always, explained by the truism that 
states will often wish to be as unhindered by legal obligation as is 
possible, so that they are able to pursue national interests free of 
excessive or unnecessary legal constraints.45 However, there are 
44 Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change 
in International Law, 38 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989) (U.K.). 
45 For example, at the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (IFRC), Geneva, 8-10 December 2015, an IFRC proposal (supported 
by a number of states) to progress better definition and refinement of the 
textually sparse but operationally important issue of detention during non-
international armed conflicts met significant resistance from some other states, 
and was thus ‘parked’ whilst alternative ways forward on the issue were 
developed and discussed – see, for example, Strengthening International 
Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, 32nd 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Res. 32IC/15/R1, 
(Dec. 10, 2015) (recommending “the pursuit of further in-depth work, in 
accordance with this Resolution, with the goal of producing one or more 
concrete and implementable outcomes in any relevant or appropriate form of a 
non-legally binding nature with the aim of strengthening IHL protections and 
ensuring that IHL remains practical and relevant to protecting persons deprived 
of their liberty in relation to armed conflict, in particular in relation to NIAC”). 
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often other factors at play in such reluctance, including treaty 
negotiation fatigue,46 capacity constraints,47 and principled concerns 
regarding the avoidance or exacerbation of emerging incoherence 
within and between legal regimes.48 
The second cause of evident reluctance among states to 
adopt a hard law solution to a governance challenge is that the 
negotiation of such a solution requires from the outset that there be 
some general agreement around the fact that there is a gap. 
Additionally, a determination as to what particular features or 
characteristics of that gap require the anticipated regulatory 
response. Third World approaches to international law, for example, 
often deconstruct the latent and sometimes unconscious imperialism 
that underpins even the choice and identification of which “gaps” 
require regulatory responses and which do not.49 Disagreement as to 
the “gap” can also be particularly and obstinately granular. Progress 
towards finalization of the Arms Trade Treaty 2014, for example, 
was hampered by disagreement as to the scope of what, precisely, 
was to be covered by the regime – types of arms, types of 
46 E.g., Stacy D. VanDeveer, Green Fatigue, Wilson Q. 55 (2003); Adil Najam, 
Unraveling of the Rio Bargain, 21 Pol. & the Life Sci. 46 (2002). 
47 E.g., Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International 
Institutions and Territorial Disputes 46(6) J. of Conflict Resolution 829 (2002); 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court 32(3) Cornell Int’l L.J. 443, 446 (1999).
48 Marttii Koskenniemi, Rept. of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law at ¶8, A/CN.4/L.682 (April,
13 2006) (“The fragmentation of the international social world has attained legal
significance
especially as it has been accompanied by the emergence of specialized and
(relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres
of legal practice.”).
49 See, e.g., BS Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A
Manifesto 8 Int’l Community L. Rev. 3 (2006); Antony Anghie and BS Chimni,
Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in
Internal Conflicts 2 Chinese J. of Int’l L. 77 (2003).
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ammunition, and so on.50 Similarly, a key factor in the ultimate 
success of negotiations for the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(Oslo Convention) 2008 was the agreed limitation of scope to a very 
particularized ordnance ambit.51 
The third reservation states often have with respect to 
adopting a hard law solution to an emerging or urgent governance 
challenge is that the development of such instruments and 
arrangements often takes significant time - precisely because of the 
consequences that follow from being legally bound by the 
subsequently agreed treaty (should the state ratify that treaty). When 
urgency dictates, and where the parties to the negotiation are few, 
and share a common regulatory goal in relation to a jointly identified 
gap, hard law can follow swiftly. For example, the fact that there 
was a degree of operational urgency around reducing the potential 
for inadvertent conflict at sea between the US and Soviet navies 
when navigating and exercising in proximity to each other, was 
50E.g., Sarah Parker, Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, 
UNIDIR (Oct. 2007), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/analysis-of-
state-views-on-an-arms-trade-treaty-332.pdf.UN Institute for Disarmament 
Research, Geneva, October 2007, §3.2.1; Arms Trade Treaty 2014, article 2(1). 
51 Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39. ‘“Cluster 
munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release 
explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and 
includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following: 
(a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics
or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
(b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic
effects;
(c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks
posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
(i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
(ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
(iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target
object;
(iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction
mechanism;
(v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating
feature…’.
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instrumental in the US-USSR INCSEA being proposed in 1968 and 
quickly finalized by 1972.52 However, other NATO – USSR 
INCSEAs (of which there were ultimately twelve) were also 
proposed from the 1970s but were finalized over longer, less 
urgency-informed timelines: UK in 1986,53 Germany in 1988,54 
France in 1989,55 and so on.56 Similarly, the US – PRC Military 
Maritime Consultative Agreement was proposed in 1995 and 
finalized in 1998,57 but in the face of emerging geopolitical rivalry 
has since faced significant hurdles to modernization.58 
52 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, U.S.- 
U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 852 U.N.T.S 151; see e.g. Pete Pedrozo, The US-China 
Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster 6 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 
207 at 2010-2011 (2012)  (the description of the operational context for INCSEA 
1972 ); David Winkler, ‘The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at 
Sea Agreement’ (2005) 28:2 Journal of Strategic Studies 361. 
53 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics concerning the Prevention of Incidents at Sea beyond the Territorial 
Sea, 1986. 
54 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the 
Prevention of Incidents at Sea Outside Territorial Waters, 1988. 
55 Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and the Government of the French Republic concerning the Prevention of 
Incidents at Sea Outside Territorial Waters, 1989. 
56 See, Bilateral military agreements between NATO member states and the 




57 Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of 
America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China 
on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime 
Safety, PRC-U.S., Jan. 18, 1998. 
58 Steven Stashwick, New US-China Military Agreement Won’t Be Defusing Any 
Crises, CHINA US Focus, Sept .11 2017, https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-
security/why-the-china-us-mil-to-mil-framework-is-and-isnt, 
[https://perma.cc/PF29-FMRC]; David Griffiths, US-China Maritime 
Confidence Building: Paradigms, Precedents, and Prospects 19-22, (US Naval 
War College, China Maritime Studies Institute 6th Ed. July 2010); Pete Pedrozo, 
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B. Soft Law/Mixed Hard and Soft Law Options
Although soft law options can offer a means of avoiding the 
disincentives inherent in the normative, resource, time, and 
diplomatic investment required for hard law solutions. However, 
soft law options are still subject to some of the constraints of hard 
law instruments. In part, this can depend upon the extent to which 
procedure – particularly the negotiating fora employed, and the 
multilateral interests engaged – tends to “formalize” and complicate 
such projects. Soft law instruments can be eminently flexible, but as 
they are expanded to cover less agreed and thus more divisive issues, 
the time required to negotiate amendments or annexes can 
dramatically increase. For example, the piracy focused Djibouti 
Code of Conduct59 was settled after rapid negotiations in 2009; all 
parties agreed in common that the scourge of piracy warranted such 
attention and cooperation. However, the Jeddah Amendment to the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct,60 settled in 2017, took longer to finalize 
– not least because it dealt with the less unifying, more fractious
issue of deconflicting overlapping state interests in the “blue
economy,” particularly concerning competing interests and
perspectives in relation to fisheries.61
Another set of challenges to the utility of soft law responses 
to governance challenges is the degree to which hard law is present 
within ostensibly soft law instruments. This hard law shadow often 
The US-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster 217-220 
(2012) (citing apparently irreconcilable differences in interpretation of the LOSC 
1982). 
59 The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Jan. 
29, 2009. 
60 Revised Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed 
Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in the Western Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden Area, Jan. 2017. 
61 Ibid, art. 2(1). “[C]alling upon the signatory states to ‘cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent in the repression of transnational organized crime in the 
maritime domain, maritime terrorism, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 
fishing and other illegal activities at sea . . . .’” 
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manifests in two ways. The first is via the need to keep the outcome 
sufficiently “non-binding” so that signatories are willing to engage 
with the process and to adopt (in a political sense, as opposed to a 
strict legal sense) the obligations proposed. For example, the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea (CUES)62 initial draft was presented to WPNS in 
1998, but after some delay “revitalized” in 2014 in the face of 
consistent, particularly Chinese, pressure for it be clearly understood 
as ‘non-binding.’63 Similarly, whilst it was agreed that CUES would 
apply to navies and naval units,64 recent Singaporean and Philippine 
proposals that CUES be extended to Coast Guards have been met 
with inertia and even resistance.65 The Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue has similarly been working on a set of common operating 
principles to guide coast guard vessel behavior at sea since 2015.66 
The proposed South China Sea "Code of Conduct" is similarly much 
discussed, but disagreement over (amongst other things) its “legally 
binding nature” (or otherwise) may militate against rapid progress 
in the near term.67  
62 Symposium, Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, Western Pac. Naval 
(2014). 
63 Sam Bateman, CUES and Coast Guards, E. Asia F. (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/10/07/cues-and-coast-guards/, 
[https://perma.cc/8KD7-RDPF]. 
64 Id, art 1.1.1, 1.3.3. 
65 See, e.g., Lee Ying Hui, Expanding CUES: Singapore’s Timely Proposal, 
RSIS Commentary (CO16063) (March 24, 2016, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/rsis/co16063-expanding-cues-singapores-timely-proposal/#.WzBij-
QnaUk, [https://perma.cc/27RC-9BG8]. 
66 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ‘South China Sea’ – available at 
https://www.hdcentre.org/activities/south-china-sea/, [https://perma.cc/PQ26-
JBNN]; Michael Vatikiotis, ‘ Calming the waters in the South China Sea: a win–
win for China’, The Strategist, ASPI, 24 May 2017 – available at 
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/calming-waters-south-china-sea-win-win-
china/, [https://perma.cc/PC35-FEA4]. 
67 Wei-chin Lee, ‘Cracking a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea’, Asia 
Dialogue, 19 February 2018 – available at 
http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/02/19/cracking-a-code-of-conduct-for-the-
south-china-sea/, [https://perma.cc/6ETA-G7L5]; Teddy Ng and Liu Zhen, 
‘Coastguard vessels in South China Sea need code of conduct amid increasing 
risk of clashes in contested waters, say analysts: Nations’ rival territorial claims 
in region hindering efforts to increase cooperation, say observers’, South China 
Morning Post, 08 May 2016 – available at 
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The second hard law shadow that can frustrate otherwise 
laudable attempts at soft law governance is the degree to which such 
instruments founder upon disagreements regarding the 
underpinning hard law, or rub up against contested hard law 
interpretations whilst attempting to agree less confronting soft law 
normative statements or guidance. As an instrument of hard law, the 
LOSC 1982 has several terminological “constructive ambiguities”68 
built into the text as means of facilitating universality of ratification. 
For example, the absence of any agreed parameters around what 
level of force a coastal state can use in “requiring” a delinquent 
warship to leave its territorial sea.69 UN Security Council resolutions 
also often employ constructive ambiguity precisely to achieve 
sufficient consensus to allow a draft to pass by majority and avoid 
the veto by one of the P5.70 A particular challenge for soft law 
“codes” can thus be the need to ensure that no party to the 
negotiations sees any textual reference as surreptitiously 
incorporating or endorsing a “hard law” interpretation with which it 
disagree. For example, as to the impermissibility or otherwise of 
requiring prior notification for warship innocent passage,71 or as to 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1942543/south-
china-sea-coastguard-code-still-stuck-choppy, [https://perma.cc/VNA8-ND94]. 
68 The US Institute of Peace defines ‘constructive ambiguity’ as follows: ‘If two 
parties to a negotiation cannot agree on an issue, they may be able to paper over 
their disagreement by using ambiguous language. The negotiation can then 
proceed, in the hope that the issue will be resolved at a later time or cease to be a 
concern…’ – available at https://www.usip.org/glossary/constructive-ambiguity. 
69 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art. 30 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994): ‘If any warship 
does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning 
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance 
therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the 
territorial sea immediately.’ 
70 See e.g.  Dapo Akande & Marko Milanovic, The constructive Ambiguity of the 
Security Council’s ISIS Resolution, EJIL: Talk!, www.ejitalk.org/the-
constructive-ambiguity of-the-security-council’s isis-resolution/, 
[https://perma.cc/2HMU-HHRL].  
71 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Feb. 25, 1992, 1,1 
(China).  
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the proper characterization of the right for third states to conduct 
military exercises in other states’ Exclusive Economic Zones.72 
IV. ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS TO IMPROVED CLARITY AND
COMPLIANCE 
A. Processes
Multilateral processes serve a number of functions. Often,
they are specifically designed to achieve a particular instrumental 
outcome - such as the IMO facilitated Best Management Practices 
for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4 – 2011),73 and 
(for West Africa in particular) the Guidelines for Owners, Operators 
and Masters for Protection Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
Region (Version 2, June 2016).74 However, processes can also serve 
other vital functions, for example, by providing fora for, inter alia, 
expert track 1.5 engagement,75  information sharing,76 norm 
72 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations made upon 
signature, ratification, accession or succession or anytime thereafter, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 (“…(b) The Government of the Republic of India 
understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States 
to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military 
exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or 
explosives without the consent of the coastal State”). 
73 Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, 4 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 1 (Aug. 2011). 
74 Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection Against Piracy 
in the Gulf of Guinea Region, 2 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 1 
(2016). 
75 See David Atwood, NGOs and Multilateral Disarmament Diplomacy: Limits 
and Possibilities in THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT
AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, 33-54 (John Borrie and Vanessa Martin 
Randin, eds., UNIDIR 2006). 
76 See Rob McLaughlin & Tamsin Paige, The Role of Information Sharing in 
Counter-Piracy in the Horn of Africa Region: A Model for Transnational 
Criminal Enforcement Operations, 12 J. OF INT'L LAW & INT'L REL. 82 (2016). 
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building,77 consensus building,78 managing complexity,79 and 
operational deconfliction.80 Two examples of successful process 
approaches to implementation in the maritime domain are the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). Both processes focused 
upon promoting implementation of existing obligations, including 
in relation to the LOSC 1982, the Suppression of Unlawful Activities 
at Sea Convention 1988, and a range of counter-terrorism treaties 
and UNSC resolutions. However, these processes also acted as 
conduits and clearing houses for information sharing, coordination, 
and exercise management.81 There is no irremediable reason why a 
77 See Keith Krause, Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN 
Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 8 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 247 (2002). 
78 See Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56:2 INT'L ORGANIZATION 339 
(2002). 
79 I William Zartman, Two’s Company and More’s a Crowd: The Complexities 
of Multilateral Negotiation International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches 
to the Management of Complexity, Joy Bass Publishers, 1994) 
80 See, for example, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) process 
for ‘coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and 
coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and 
the western Indian Ocean’, which now involves representatives from 33 states, 
15 international organizations, and the maritime industry - 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-
shade; Andrew Erickson & Austin Strange, China and the International 
Antipiracy Effort, The Diplomat, November, 1 2013: ‘the PLAN has actively 
engaged with other navies whom it perceives as being “in the same boat” with 
regard to contemporary maritime piracy. The Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism, which meets quarterly in Bahrain, has been 
the primary interface for that engagement. All naval ships or convoys fighting 
piracy are considered affiliated members. SHADE is not an organization but a 
facilitating venue…’ https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-and-the-
international-antipiracy-effort/, [https://perma.cc/LMY8-AEBN]. 
81 There is an extensive literature on both the PSI and the CGPCS - see, for 
example (and as indicative only): Douglas Guilfoyle, Prosecuting Pirates: The 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Governance and 
International Law, 4:1 Global Policy 73 (2013); Danielle Zach, D Conor Seyle, 
& Jens Vestergaard Madsen, Burden-sharing Multi-level Governance: A Study 
of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Oceans Beyond 
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“process” based approach to reinforcing, clarifying, and 
implementing existing LOSC 1982 (and associated) obligations and 
authorities would not work as well in any given regional context as 
it has worked in both global (BMP4; PSI) and some specific regional 
(Gulf of Guinea Guidelines; CGPCS) contexts. 
B. Address Evolving Challenges Through Use of Well-
Suited Existing Rules
Another option for clarifying and closing implementation 
gaps is to ascertain whether there is, in fact, a legal gap. This is a 
particularly useful approach where there is law applicable to an issue 
in general, but the detail as to how that law applies in the maritime 
domain is less well-understood. A case in point in the maritime 
context is the legal framework and limitations that attend the 
employment of privately contracted armed security personnel 
(PCASP) in ship protection roles in high risk transit areas. Thus, 
whilst there is clear law on jurisdiction as applicable to the 
deployment of private security personnel ashore, the challenge for 
PCASP at sea is not the absence of a correlative legal framework, 
but rather accounting for and incorporating the additional 
jurisdictional framework that applies at sea. That is, there is no 
“gap” in the law for PCASP, but rather an additional analytical step 
or legal overlay. The fact that issues such as the “default” 
jurisdiction of flag states regarding the carriage of weapons on board 
vessels must therefore be analyzed in light of the strengthening 
jurisdiction of coastal states with respect to carriage of weapons in 
vessels intending to enter their internal waters, does not indicate a 
shortfall in regulation. Rather, this merely points to the need for 
more nuanced legal assessment. Similarly, legal regulation of use of 
force by PCASP is not a lacunae in the law. Any assessment simply 
requires additional contextualized legal analysis in order to establish 
Piracy, (One Earth Future Foundation 2013); David Cooper, Challenging 
Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative for “Middle Power Theory’ 7:3 Foreign Pol’y 
Analysis 317 (2011); Jack Garvey, The International Institutional Imperative for 
Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, 10:2 J. of Conflict and Sec. L. 125 (2015). 
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how existing laws on use of force and self-defense dovetail - in the 
maritime domain - with flag state law, extraterritorially applicable 
nationality-based jurisdiction, and so on. The point is that whilst 
there is now a kernel of soft law instruments and other guidance that 
assists with understanding how law regulates PCASP,82 and this 
analysis has identified failures and gaps in domestic 
implementation, there are no “ship-stopper” gaps in the international 
legal framework as such. Again, there is no immediate reason why 
an identified regulatory or governance gap that is believed to be 
particularly acute in, for example, the Indian Ocean and West 
African regions should not and could not be subject – as a first step 
– to a similar process of assessment and application of existing law
to establish if there is, in fact, any legal gap.
C. Refined Interpretation
As noted previously, one consequence of the need to 
generate as close to universal ratification as possible for 
international constitutional instruments such as the LOSC 1982 is 
the use of constructive ambiguity as a means of achieving the 
negotiated balances required for consensus. However, quite apart 
82 For example: Academic and NGO sponsored publications such as Phillip 
Drew & Rob McLaughlin, Handbook on the Use of Force for Private Security 
Companies, (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2016); commercial instruments such as the 
BIMCO GUARDCON (Standard Contract for the Employment of Security 
Guards on Vessels) https://www.bimco.org/news/press-
releases/20161101_updates-to-guardcon-guidance, and BIMCO’s Guidance on 
Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) by Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel (PCASP) in Defence of a Merchant Vessel (MV) 
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/industry_initiatives/bimco/bimco_guidance
_on_rules_for_use_of_force.pdf; and international organization guidance and 
standards documents such as IMO Circulars 
http://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/pages/private-
armed-security.aspx, [https://perma.cc/QP36-9BMJ], and ISO Standards 
https://www.iso.org/standard/42146.html, [https://perma.cc/2CJ8-YHY4]; and 
national guidance such as that developed by the UK Dept. of Transport’s Interim 
Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed Guards to Defend 
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from facilitating consensus, such practical concessions to reality can 
also create interpretive space that is ultimately beneficial to 
achieving (albeit sometimes delayed) implementation outcomes. 
Indeed, postponing further discussion of a contentious issue until 
there is more scope for agreement as to the required granularity or 
nuance is not always a negative outcome. One example is the scope 
of boarding state jurisdiction over VWON. Whilst the LOSC 1982 
provides a level of detail around the “statelessness” implications of 
certain VWON (for example Article 92(2)), other provisions 
regarding VWON (such as Article 101(1)(d)) provide much less 
clarity – and thus wider scope for interpretive differences. This is 
the case, for example, with respect to the nature and persistence of 
boarding state jurisdiction over VWON. However, the desire to 
attain greater precision as to the application of jurisdiction over 
VWON has recently been enlivened by the catalytic effect of 
increased traffic in illicit drugs by sea in the West and Mid-Indian 
Ocean, which has made refined interpretation of this opaque issue 
an operational, legal, and diplomatic priority.83 So long as such 
approaches are appropriately calibrated to deal with an existing and 
agreed concern, or are focused upon remedying a generally agreed 
ill such as the traffic in illicit drugs by sea, there is no immediate 
reason why they cannot prove effective across other regional 
contexts. 
D. Use Existing but Under-employed Mechanisms
The fourth option for achieving better implementation of 
LOSC 1982 obligations – one which does not rely upon the 
negotiation of new hard law, nor mixed hard and soft law-based 
codes of conduct – is to employ existing but under-utilized 
mechanisms and obligations in new ways. Indeed, it is in almost all 
circumstances easier to build a consistent and coherent soft law 
extension on top of an existing hard law obligation, than it is to agree 
83 See generally: Rob McLaughlin, Towards a More Effective Counter-drugs 
Regime in the Indian Ocean, 12:1 J. of the Indian Ocean Region 24 (2016); 
Angeline Lewis, Flag Verification on the High Seas: Understanding 
Requirements for Masters and Commanders, 30:2 Int’l. J. of Marine and Coastal 
L. 335 (2015).
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to ambitious, widely scoped, but contextually disconnected soft 
and/or hard law instruments. To this end, one example of a nuanced, 
useful, and well-calibrated existing mechanism is the rule set to 
counter-drug trafficking by sea established by LOSC 1982 article 
108 and amplified by article 17 of the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Vienna Convention) 1988.84 Many states have ratified 
both instruments85, and thus have already adopted the consultation, 
cooperation, and information-sharing obligations that are built into 
Vienna Convention Article 17 in particular. That is, there is a clear, 
unambiguous, and uncontentious existing obligation and 
mechanism designed to facilitate asking for and communicating 
consent to board vessels suspected of illicit drug trafficking in 
international waters. It is thus less confronting to seek to employ this 
accepted mechanism and its associated obligations as the baseline 
or template for developing additional communications linkages for 
other maritime crimes of shared concern, than it is to propose new 
binding obligations of uncertain utility. 
V. CONCLUSION
As the experience of the three UN Conferences on the Law 
of the Sea well illustrates, developing new hard law in the maritime 
domain takes an inordinate amount of time – twelve years in the case 
of the LOSC 1982. Recognition of this fact organically within the 
LOSC is well attested by its consciously fostered and in-built 
features of flexibility and conduciveness. But these features can take 
implementation only so far, and concerns over making contested 
obligations legally binding, and the challenges of deconflicting 
multilateral concerns regarding rights and obligations in the 
"commons" add further layers of complication to the traditional 
84 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) 1988 at 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf, [https://perma.cc/37UR-
P5TZ]. 
85 Treaty against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, art. 29, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 
U.N.T.S. 95. 
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response of generating hard law and mixed hard/soft law responses 
to oceans governance challenges. However, there are other ways to 
pursue improved implementation, enforcement, and cooperation 
outcomes that send equally significant diplomatic signals about 
commitment and intention. Process, for example, can highlight 
existing obligations and principles of governance by publicizing 
their utility, and promoting their deployment. Explicit reference to 
existing law that is capable of solving an evolving challenge or 
pointing the way to a resolution – as with PCASP, for example – can 
likewise relocate that challenge from the realm of novelty and 
"gaps," and place it more manageably within an existing framework. 
Similarly, refined interpretation - digging deeper into the existing 
law, so to speak – can provide a sound basis for dealing with 
implementation challenges, and carries with it the benefits of a "just 
in time" approach to solving problems when solutions become 
necessary, and thus are more likely to be cooperatively negotiated. 
This is the state of play now, for example, with respect to the under-
developed interpretation of jurisdiction over VWON. And finally, 
the capacity to use already agreed mechanisms – such as the LOSC 
1982 and Vienna Convention 1988 rule set around combating the 
traffic of illicit drugs by sea – in order to achieve other maritime 
confidence building or governance outcomes should not be ignored. 
And although these options are often shaped by the attributes and 
concerns of specific maritime regions, there is no reason why any or 
all of these alternative measures for increasing implementation of, 
and informing compliance with, LOSC 1982 obligations could not 
at least be considered more universally as possible solutions for 
implementation gaps. 
